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SURFACE RIGHTS OF MINERAL OWNERS - WHAT




Traditionally, courts have construed conveyances that
separate mineral interests from the residual fee as containing an
implied easement.1 The easement grants the owner of the mineral
estate the right to consume the surface of the land to obtain the
underground minerals. 2 However, 'recent statutory and case law,
although recognizing the mineral owner's need to use the surface,
require the mineral owner to pay the owner of the surface estate for
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis; B.S., 1953, Eastern
Illinois University; LL. B., 1958, University of Illinois. Member of the Bar in Illinois and Indiana.
1. See, e.g., Union Producing Co. v. Pittman, 245 Miss. 427, -_, 146 So. 2d 553, 555 (1962)
(owner of mineral interest has the right to enter, occupy, and make such use of the surface lands as is
reasonably necessary to produce the minerals); Placid Oil Co. v. Lee, 243 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1951) (owner of mineral interest may use as much of surface land as is reasonably
necessary to produce the minerals).
2. See, e.g., Wilcox Oil Co. v. Lawson, 341 P.2d 591 (Okla. 1959). In Wikox the court described
a lessee's right of access as follows:
The holder of a valid oil and gas lease has the right and privilege to go on the land and
do all those things necessary and incidental to the drilling of wells, including the right
to the use of the surface, and in the absence of a provision that lessee would be liable
for growing crops, the only basis for recovery of damages is proof of wanton or
negligent destruction, or that damages were to [a] portion of land not reasonably
necessary for oil and gas development.
Id. at 594. Generally, the courts did not specify the doctrinal basis for the lessee's right of access. See
Zillman & Tyler, The Common Law of Access and Surface Use in" Mining, J. Mm. L. & POL'y 267,
278 (1985). Some courts, however, describe the right of access as attributable to custom or implied
from the document of transfer. See id. at 273-78. Other courts refer to the right as an easement. See id.
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the surface consumed in the process of extracting the minerals.3
This Article discusses the traditional rule of mineral easements,
common-law exceptions to the rule, and several legislative
modifications of the rule. The Article concludes with a survey of
practices in the mineral industry and suggestions for future
judicial treatment of mineral easements.
II. THE TRADITIONAL VIEW
Under the traditional view, the scope of the mineral owner's
implied easement is determined by reasonableness: the mineral
owner is entitled to use as much of the surface estate as is
reasonably necessary to obtain access to the minerals.4 Conduct is
reasonable if it is consistent with the practices of the extraction
industry.5 Until recently, there was little or no balancing between
the interests of the mineral owner and the interests of the surface
owner. 6 The mineral owner was the owner of the dominant estate
and the surface owner was the owner of the servient estate.7 Thus,
the interests of the mineral owner prevailed over the interests of the
surface owner when the two conflicted. 8
Under the traditional rule, the mineral owner has no
obligation to pay the surface owner for the reasonable amount of
surface consumed in the development of the mineral estate.9 In
using the surface the mineral owner is merely exercising his
3. See, e.g., Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1984) (mineral owner
must pay for the surface damaged in the acquisition of minerals not specified in the mineral lease);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-04 (Supp. 1985) (mineral owner shall pay surface owner for damage to
surface of land).
4. Union Producing, 245 Miss. at -_, 146 So. 2d at 555; Wilcox Oil, 341 P.2d at 594; Placid Oil,
243 S.W.2d at 862.
5. See Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 136 (N.D. 1979). In Hunt the North Dakota
Supreme Court stated: "The reasonableness of the method and manner of using the dominant
mineral estate may be measured by what are usual, customary and reasonable practices in the
industry under like circumstances of time, place, and [surface] estate uses." Id.
6. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 812 (Tex. 1972) (mineral owner may
exploit underground water necessary to its water flood extraction method); Chapapas v. Delhi-
Taylor Oil Corp., 323 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (surface owner must not interfere with
mineral owner's right to use the surface).
7. 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW 5 218, at 186.45 (1985).
8. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co., 483 S.W.2d at 810. In Sun Oil Co. the issue before the court was whether
the mineral owner was entitled to deplete an underground reservoir. Id. at 809. The court,
evidencing the dominance of the mineral estate, held that the mineral owner was not required to seek
alternative sources of water. Id. at 812.
9. See 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 7, 1 218.7, at 225. Williams and Meyers suggest
that the mineral owner may do the following without incurring expense to the surface owner:
(1) [H[e may cut trees at the site of a well or appurtenant installation;
(2) he may employ salt water produced from wells on the premises for
repressu ring operations;
(3) he may take water necessary for the exploitation of the mineral rights;
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property rights under the easement. 10 The mineral owner is liable
only if he or she uses more of the surface than reasonably necessary
or uses the property in a manner unrelated to the extraction of
minerals. 11
The surface owner could, of course, predicate a claim for relief
against the mineral owner on general principles of tort or contract
law.1 2 Thus, the mineral owner would be liable for all damages
caused as a result of his or her negligence.13 The mineral owner also
could contract for liability different from that imposed by
traditional property concepts. 14 For example, the parties might
agree that the mineral owner is to pay for all crop damage resulting
from the mineral owner's use of the land. 15 The possibility that the
mineral owner might be liable in tort or contract, however, does
not in any way detract from his or her role as the dominant party in
the easement relationship.
The basis for implying the easement in mineral deeds is the
same as that for implying easements in other situations. 16 For
(4) he may house employees on the premises who labor there; and
(5) he may construct roads to drill sites.
Id. at 225-226.2 (citations omitted).
10. See id.
11. See Sun Oil Co., 483 S.W.2d at 810 (stating that the mineral owner may use as much of the
premises as is "reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes of the lease"); see also 1 H. WILLIAMS
& C. MEYERS, supra note 7, § 218.8, at 286.2. Williams and Meyers suggest that the mineral owner
may be liable for the following actions:
[T]he construction of a system of roads to well locations in excess of the
reasonable needs of the lessee;
occupation of more of the surface than was reasonably necessary for the full
enjoyment of the minerals;
maintenance of pumping units in excess of seven feet in height thereby interfering
with landowner's use of an automatic sprinkler system;
negligent conduct in the use of equipment which had outlived its usefulness and
had become so deteriorated that it was no longer fit for the use to which it was being
put, thus inflicting surface damage from leaking oil;
taking water when not authorized or in excess of the amount authorized to be
taken; and
use of a portion of the surface in connection with operations on other premises.
Id. at 226.3-226.6
12. Discussion Notes by Eugene 0. Kuntz in 10 OIL & GAS REP. 996, following Wilcox Oil Co.
v. Lawson, 341 P.2d 591, 10 OIL & GAS REP. 991 (Okla. 1959). Kuntz stated the following
concerning a mineral owner's liability for destruction of the land's surface: "[Damages] may be
recovered on the basis of contraci under the provisions-of the lease or on the basis of tort if the
operator exceeds his reasonable right of access or produces damages willfully or negligently." Id.
13. Id.
14. See id.
15. See, e.g., Wohlford v. American Gas Prod. Co., 218 F.2d 213, 215 (5th Cir. 1955) (lease
provided that the lessee would pay for damage to growing crops); Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust,
551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976) (same).
16. See Pyramid Coal Corp. v. Pratt, 229 Ind. 648, 651-52, 99 N.E.2d 427, 429 (1951). In
Pyramid the court analogized the traditional, necessity easement, which allows access to part of the
surface if there is no other way to obtain access, to the necessity of the mineral owner to obtain access
to the minerals. Id. The court then held that the mineral owner had retained an implied easement of
access to the minerals. Id. at 653, 99 N.E.2d at 430.
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example, if a tract of land is divided by a conveyance that will result
in cutting off either the retained or the conveyed land from access to
a highway, an easement will be implied for access.' 7 The policy
involved in implying the easement is obvious. To hold otherwise
would render the inaccessible land useless. 18  The efficient
utilization of property, rather than the actual intention of the
parties, is the basis for the creation of implied easements. 19
All of the policy arguments in favor of implying access
easements for surface estates apply with even more force in the
mineral severance situation. Without access through the surface,
the minerals could not be extracted and the mineral estate would be
worthless. Thus, it was quite natural that the courts turned to the
existing body of law relating to implied easements when creating
the right of access. It does not appear, however, that the courts
considered whether the solution overshot the objective by giving the
mineral owner more rights than were needed to make the mineral
estate productive. The courts never seemed to consider the
possibility of making the mineral owner's right of access contingent
upon an obligation to pay for the surface estate consumed by the
operation.
The courts' failure to consider this alternative was apparently
due to the absence of a legal doctrine embodying these legal
interests. Indeed, the concept that most closely resembles these
interests is eminent domain. Eminent domain, however, is a power
that can be exercised only by the legislature. 20 When legislatures
confronted the access problem with respect to surface estates, they
typically granted a right of access under the label of eminent
domain. 21 The existence of this type of legislation was held by the
17. See id. at 651-52, 99 N.E.2d at 429 (reciting the law of easement by necessity).
18. Cf. id. Although the court in Pyramid did not give the rationale for the necessity easement,
the easement was granted to give value to the mineral estate. See id.
19. See id. The necessity easement is based on the presumption that a conveyance would not
have been made but for an understanding between the parties that each would have a right of access
to his or her own tract. Id.; see also Finn v. Williams, 376 Ill. 95, 33 N.E.2d 226, 228 (1941). In Finn
the court determined that the grantees of a section of land owned an implied easement, even though
approximately forty years had elapsed between the date of conveyance and the assertion of the
easement. Id. at -, 33 N.E.2d at 227-28. At the time of the conveyance, the original grantee had
access to the land by way of roads over the land of third persons. Id. at.-, 33 N.E.2d at 227. These
roads had since been closed. Id. The court held that an easement had been implied in the original
conveyance, and was not enforceable. Id. at __, 33 N.E.2d at 228. Because the easement was not
needed at the time of the original conveyance, the decision illustrates that the easement arises even
when the parties do not contemplate its creation. See id. at__ , 33 N.E.2d at 227-28.
20. See R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE.LAw OF PROPERTY S 9.1 (1984)
(eminent domain is a governmental power, although it can be delegated to public service
corporations).
21. See, e.g., WYo. STAT. SS 24-9-101 to -104 (1977). These statutes provide a procedure for
access to a landlocked estate. See id. The procedure provides that the state will create an access route,
but only upon payment of the necessary compensation by the landlocked owner to the servient
owner. See id. S 24-9-101.
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courts to have supplanted the common-law rules relating to implied
easements 2 Thus, in the past the characterization of the right of
access for mineral estates was limited to one of two options - the
common-law scheme creating an easement for access to the surface,
or a legislative enactment supplanting the common law. Recently,
however, courts and legislatures have reexamined the available
options without feeling inhibited by the existing labeling system. 
23
III. COMMON-LAW EXCEPTIONS TO THE
TRADITIONAL VIEW
Although the common law provided that a mineral owner need
not compensate the surface owner for surface damages, long
standing breaches exist of the otherwise universally accepted rule.
In Wiser Oil Co. v. Conley24 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held
that an oil and gas lessee was required to compensate the lessor for
damages occasioned by the institution of a secondary recovery
system known as "water flooding," which would consume the
majority of the surface.2 5 The court recognized that the lessee had
the right to use the property, but concluded that "principles of
justice and humanity ... require that reasonable compensation be
paid the landowner for the devastation wrought. "26 The court
reasoned that the parties had not anticipated this new form of
production when the lease was executed in 1917.27 Because the
parties had not anticipated the degree of damage that would result
from water flooding, the lessee was required to compensate the
lessor for the devastation brought about by this new type of
production.28 The result in Wiser is predicated upon an implied
right of access, coupled with an obligation to compensate the
surface owner for damages caused by the exercise of that right.
29
This obligation to pay, however, is apparently restricted to cases in
22. See, e.g., Snell v. Ruppert, 541 P.2d 1042, 1046 (Wyo. 1975).
23. See, e.g., Wiser Oil Co. v. Conley, 346 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Ky. 1960) (oil and gas lessee has a
right of access to the surface but must compensate landowner for surface damages); IND. CODE ANN.
S 32-5-7-2(b)-(c) (Burns Supp. 1986) (same). For a discussion of Wiser, see infra notes 24-31 and
accompanying text. For the texts of subsections (b) and (c) of S 32-5-7-2 of the Indiana Code, see infra
notes 73-74.
24. 346 S.W.2d 718 (Ky. 1960).
25. Wiser Oil Co. v. Conley, 346 S.W.2d 718, 720-22 (Ky. 1960). In Wiser conventional
methods of obtaining oil became unprofitable. Id. at 720. Thus, the mineral owners resorted to the
only profitable option available - "water flooding" the wells. Id.
26. Id. at 721.
27. Id. at 721-22. The technology for water flooding the wells existed at the time of the mineral
conveyance. Id. at 721. Nevertheless, the court held that water flooding was not within the
contemplation of the parties when the deed was executed. Id. at 721- 22.
28. See id.
29. Seeid. at 721.
1987]
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which the surface is substantially damaged. 30 The court's decision
indicates that the conventional easement approach would
determine the rights of the parties in most cases. 31
A strip mining case from Colorado reached a result similar to
that of Wiser. In Barker v. Mintz32 the Colorado Supreme Court
determined that the owner of a coal interest did not have the right
to strip mine, even though the severance deed expressly granted the
mineral owner the right to use as much of the surface as was
reasonably necessary to sever the coal. 33 The court reasoned that
the word "use" could not be construed to mean "destroy." ' 34 The
court did, however, deny the surface owner an injunction to
prevent the strip mining operation. 35 The denial was premised on
the adequacy of the legal remedy of damages and on the inequity
that would result if the coal owner were denied access to the coal. 36
The result, however, is exactly the same as in the Wiser case: the
mineral owner has the right to destroy the surface, and the surface




Another line of cases reached a similar result. These cases
usually involved a coal severance deed that granted the coal owner
the right to use as much of the surface as was reasonably necessary
to mine the coal, but only upon payment of a stated amount per
acre. 3  Courts have construed these clauses in a variety of ways. In
30. See id. The court emphasized that the extraction method involved in Wiser "will destroy or
substantially damage the landowner's remaining estates." Id.
31. See id. The court stated the following concerning the traditional common-law easement
approach: "There is a sound basis for the rule that a deed or lease of minerals carries with it the right
to use as much of the surface, or other property, as may be reasonably necessary to exploit the
minerals." Id.
32. 73 Colo. 262, 215 P. 534(1923).
33. Barker v. Mintz, 73 Colo. 262,__, 215 P. 534, 536(1923).
34. Id. at __ 215 P. at 535. The court based its holding that "use" cannot mean "destroy"
on the following principle: "It is almost universally held that where the ownership of the surface and
the mineral is severed the owner of the mineral may take it out, but must support the surface." Id.
35.Id. at __, 215 P. at 535-36.
36. Id. at__, 215 P. at 535.
37. Id.at __, 215 P. at 535-36. In holding that the mineral owner was entitled to strip mine,
but was obligated to pay for damages, the court in Barker was attempting to balance the interests
between the mineral owner and the surface owner. See id. at ., 215 P. at 535. The court stated:
I Hiere it seems to us as inequitable to give a judgment against the defendant which
destroys his property as it would be to let him take out his coal without compensation
to the plaintiff and so destroy hers. Is her property more sacred than his? No
injunction should be granted contrary to the "real justice of the case."
Id.
38. See, e.g., Jensen v. Southwestern States Management Co., 6 Kan. App. 2d 437, ... 629
P.2d 752, 753 (1981) ($70 per acre consumed); Commerce Union Bank v. Kinkade, 540 S.W.2d
861, 863 (Ky. 1976) ($30 per acre consumed), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 915 (1977); Quarto Mining Co.
v. Litman, 42 Ohio St. 2d 73, __, 326 N.E.2d 676, 678 (5100 per acre consumed), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 866 (1975).
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Commerce Union Bank v. Kinkade39 the court held that the clause did
not create a right to strip mine.40 The court reasoned that the clause
was exercisable only for the purpose of underground mining.41 In
cases from Ohio4 2 and Kansas, 43 in which the right to strip mine
was not in issue, the courts held that the clauses were exercisable
only upon payment of the current market value of the land, rather
than the undervalued amount stated in the deed.4 4 When the clause
is modified in this manner, there seems to be no reason why it
should not be construed to permit strip mining.
Ultimately, the Ohio and Kansas cases reach the result of the
Wiser decision: they require the mineral owner to make reasonable
payment for use of the surface. 45 Moreover, the Kansas court stated
that the surface owner is entitled to payment when a mineral owner
uses the surface pursuant to an implied easement, as well as when
the surface is used pursuant to an express easement.4 6
A series of cases exists in which courts have attempted to
mitigate the harshness of the common-law easement doctrine
through construction of the phrase "other minerals." Mineral
leases often convey "other minerals" immediately after the
conveyance of a specified mineral. 47 The courts have limited the
meaning of "other minerals" to those minerals that can be
39. 540 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 915 (1977).
40. Commerce Union Bank v. Kinkade, 540 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Ky. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
915 (1977).
41. Id. The court appeared to base its holding on the language of the coal deed. Id. The court
stated:
The language of the conveyance in each of the three deeds is such that it must be
readily realized that there was no grant of rights necessary for removing the coal by the
open-pit or strip method but rather the language expresses the granting of rights which
are primarily those necessary in the conducting of an underground mining operation.
Id.; see also Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co., 38 Ohio St. 2d 244, -, 313 N.E.2d 374, 376, 378-79
(1974) (existence of clause in coal deed requiring payment of $50 per acre did not create the right to
strip mine).
42. See Quarto Mining Co. v. Litman, 42 Ohio St. 2d 73, 326 N.E.2d 676 (1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 866 (1975).
43. SeeJensen v. Southwestern States Management Co., 6 Kan. App. 2d 437, 629 P.2d 752
(1981).
44. Quarto, 42 Ohio St. 2d at __ , 326 N.E.2d at 686;Jensen, 6 Kan. App. 2d at -, 629 P.2d
at 757. The deeds in both Quarto and Jensen were several decades old, and the prices stated in the
deeds were far below current market rates. Quarto, 42 Ohio St. 2d at __, 326 N.E.2d at 686; Jensen,
6 Kan. App. 2d at __, 629 P.2d at 753, 757. The court in Quarto stated: "Although [the prices in
the deed] might have expressed the intent of the parties at [the time the deed was created], and for a
reasonable time thereafter, it is most unlikely that such prices are at present equitable, in light of
widespread economic changes." Quarto, 42 Ohio St. 2d at -, 326 N.E.2d at 686.
45. See Quarto, 42 Ohio St. 2d at , 326 N.E.2d at 686; Jensen, 6 Kan. App. 2d at __ , 629
P.2d at 757.
46. SeeJensen, 6 Kan. App. 2d at __, 629 P.2d at 756.
47. See, e.g., Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex. 1980) (an interest in "oil, gas and other
minerals"); Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 349 (Tex. 1971) ("an undivided 1/2 interest in and to
all of the oil, gas and other minerals").
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extracted without undue damage to the surface. 4 This construction
is, perhaps, best illustrated by a pre-1984 line of Texas cases, that
begins with Acker v. Guinn. 49
In Acker the Texas Supreme Court held that a substance was
not a mineral, within the meaning of the phrase "other minerals,"
if the extraction of the substance might be surface destructive. 50
The key word in the holding is "might." Thus, in each case, courts
must determine whether the available methods of extracting the
particular substance could possibly cause destruction of the surface.
If extraction might destroy the surface, the substance is not
considered a mineral.
51
In Reed v. Wylie52 the Texas Supreme Court gave the rule an
unusual twist. In Reed the court held that the time for determining
whether a particular substance could be extracted without
destroying the surface was when a dispute actually arose
concerning ownership of the mineral. 53 Thus, ownership of a
48. See Reed, 597 S.W.2d at 747; Acker, 464S.W.2d at 353.
49. 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971).
50. Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971). The court's reasoning for holding that
the phrase "other minerals" did not contemplate minerals that can be removed only by surface
destructive techniques was as follows:
The parties to a mineral lease or deed usually think of the mineral estate as including
valuable substances that are removed from the ground by means of wells or mine
shafts. This estate is dominant, of course, and its owner is entitled to make reasonable
use of the surface for the production of his minerals. It is not ordinarily contemplated,
however, that the utility of the surface for agricultural or grazing purposes will be
destroyed or substantially impaired. Unless the contrary intention is affirmatively and
fairly expressed, therefore, a grant or reservation of "minerals" or "mineral rights"
should not be construed to include a substance that must be removed by methods that
will, in effect, consume or deplete the surface estate.
Id.
51. See id. But see Spurlock v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 143 Ariz. 469, 694 P.2d 299 (Ct. App.
1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985). In Spurlock the Arizona Court of Appeals refused to use
surface destruction as a basis for determining whether a substance was a mineral. Id. at __ , 694
P.2d at 310 & n.9. The court indicated that any commercially valuable substance distinct from the
soil is a mineral, and is therefore owned by the mineral lessee. See id. at __, 694 P.2d at 310. The
court stated, however, that a mineral lessee may not destroy or substantially interfere with the
surface estate when extracting minerals not specified in the lease. Id.
52. 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980).
53. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980). The court stated that the test to
determine whether a mineral constitutes "other minerals" is "whether any reasonable method,
including such a method as of the date of this opinion, of removal of the lignite, coal or iron will consume,
deplete or destroy the surface." Id. (emphasis added). The court's test was the product of concern
regarding the difficulty in proving methods of extraction at the time the lease was signed. Id. The
court stated:
The older the instrument, the more difficult the proof would be. The parties would
have to employ an expert, or experts, who could testify as to the state of the art as of
the date of the execution of the instrument. It might result in the ownership of the
substance on adjacent tracts being different depending upon the testimony of experts
as to the state of the art at the date of the instrument. This rule had, and would have, a
very unstabilizing effect upon land titles.
Id. Thus, the court rejected a test based on the time of conveyance. Id.
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mineral substance changes as the technology relating to its
extraction changes. 54 As long as the substance is not extractable
without surface destruction, it is not a mineral and, therefore, is not
part of the estate conveyed to the mineral owner. But once the
industry develops a method to extract the substance without surface
destruction, it becomes- a mineral and belongs to the mineral
owner.
In Texas, at the time the Acker and Reed cases were decided, the
common-law rule concerning the surface rights of mineral owners
was in full force. 55 Thus, if a substance was a mineral for the
purpose of construing the phrase "other minerals," the mineral
owner had the right to use as much of the surface as was reasonably
necessary to remove it.56 The mineral owner was the dominant
party in the relationship, determining how and when to pursue
developmental objectives.5 7 Accordingly, the mineral owner had no
obligation to compensate the surface owner. 58 Reasonableness, as
governed by industry standards, was the only limitation imposed
on the acts of the mineral owner.5 9
In June of 1983, the Acker-Reed line of cases was overruled by
Moser v. United States Steel.60 Moser, however, operates prospectively
only. 6' Thus, the Acker-Reed rules are still in effect for deeds
executed prior to June of 1983.62
In Moser the Texas Supreme Court delivered a major blow to
the traditional easement approach. The court, however, reaffirmed
the validity of the traditional easement approach in some cases.
The court held that the traditional implied easement approach
would govern the surface rights for minerals specifically named in
54. See id.
55. See, e.g., Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1984) (mineral
lessee has the right to use as much of the surface as reasonably necessary to extract minerals); Sun Oil
Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Tex. 1972) (same for oil and gas lessee). For a brief
discussion of Sun Oil Co., see supra note 8.
56. SeeMoser, 676 S.W.2d at 103; Sun Oil Co., 483 S.W.2d at 810.
57. See Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 103 (the mineral lessee owns the dominant estate, and may use the
surface as reasonably necessary); Sun Oil Co., 483 S.W.2d at 810 (same for oil and gas lessee).
58. See Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 103 (when a specific mineral is conveyed, mineral owner's liability
is limited to negligently inflicted damage); see also Sun Oil Co., 483 S.W.2d at 810 (oil and gas lessee
has "free use" of the surface).
59. See Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 136 (N.D. 1979) (discussing the standard
of reasonableness). For the text of the North Dakota Supreme Court's standard of reasonableness,
see supra note 5.
60. 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984).
61. Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1984). In Moser the court
stated that "the rules announced in this case are to be applied only prospectively from the date ofour
original opinion, June 8, 1983." Id.
62. See id.
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the mineral severance deed. 63 Thus, the mineral owner would
obtain an easement to use the surface, and would incur no liability
to pay for surface use.
64
Concerning the minerals conveyed pursuant to the phrase
"other minerals," however, the court stated that a mineral owner
must pay for the surface consumed in the acquisition of these
minerals. 65 The mineral owner does, however, acquire an easement
to use as much of the surface as is reasonably necessary to acquire
"other minerals." 66 With this system, it is no longer necessary to
continue the traditional approach to the construction of the phrase
"other minerals." ' 67  Because the surface owner is entitled to
compensation for the surface consumed, substances could be
considered minerals without regard to whether extraction would
destroy the surface.
The decision in Moser accommodates several interests. It gives
certainty to the phrase "other minerals." At the same time, the
decision assures surface owners that they will be paid for the surface
consumed by operations other than those relating to minerals
specifically mentioned in the deed. 68 Since oil is often specifically
63. Id. The court's holding that the traditional easement approach would govern the surface
rights of minerals specifically named in the deed was based on the intention of the parties to the
severence deed. Id. The court stated:
Restricting the mineral owner's liability to negligently inflicted damage to, or
excessive use of, the suface estate is justified where a mineral is specifically conveyed.
It is reasonable to assume a grantor who expressly conveys a mineral which may or
must be removed by destroying a portion of the surface estate anticipates his surface
estate will be diminished when the mineral is removed. It is also probable the grantor




65. Id. The court stated that it cannot be assumed that a grantor whose land was destroyed by
the extraction of minerals not specified in the deed contemplated the destruction. See id.
66. Id. The court in Moser based its conclusion that an implied easement is granted to obtain
"other minerals" on necessity. Id. The court stated:
The mineral owner, as owner of the dominant estate, has the right to make any use of
the surface which is necessarily and reasonably incident to the removal of the minerals.
• . .This is an imperative rule of mineral law; a mineral owner's estate would be
worthless without the right to reach the minerals.
Id. (citations omitted).
67. Under the traditional approach, "other minerals" included only those minerals that could
be extracted without destruction of the land's surface. For a discussion of the traditional approach to
the phrase "other minerals," see supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
68. 676 S.W.2d at 103. Moser illustrates, through its legislative-like approach, that statutes,
rather than the parties' intent, govern the mineral owner/surface owner relationship. See Polston,
Recent Developments in Oil and Gas Law, 6 E. MIN. L. FounD. S 19.03[21 (1985) (supporting the
proposition that equity, rather than contract terms, should govern the relationship between an oil
and gas lessee and lessor).
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referred to in severance deeds, 69 the oil industry continues to enjoy
the traditional approach to surface rights.
Although the Texas court broke new ground in the Moser case,
it merely accomplished directly what the strip mining cases
accomplished indirectly. In the strip mining cases, when the courts
held that the coal owner had no right to utilize strip mining
methods without compensating the surface owner, 70 the effect was
to require the mineral owner to purchase the right from the surface
owner. The Moser decision gives the right as a matter of law, but,
with the extraction of "other minerals," the right is accompanied
by an obligation to pay for damages caused by the extraction of
those minerals.
7'
IV.LEGISLATIVE TREATMENT OF THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SURFACE OWNER
AND THE MINERAL OWNER
In 1951, Indiana enacted an act that purports to codify the
state's then existing law pertaining to oil and gas interests. 72 The
act provides for the implication of a surface easement in
conveyances that create oil and gas interests. 73 However, the act
69. See, e'g., Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex. 1980) (an interest in "oil, gas and other
minerals"); Acder v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 349 (Tex. 1971) ("an ,undivided 1/2 interest in and to
all of the oil, gas and other minerals").
70. See, e.g., Barker v. Mintz, 73 Colo. 262, __ , 215 P. 534, 535 (1923). For a discussion of
Barker, see supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
71. See Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 103. In Kentucky, it is interesting to note the two regimes exist
side by side. Most strip mining cases deny the right to use the surface in a destructive manner. See,
e.g., Commerce Union Bank v. Kinkade, 540 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Ky. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 915
(1977). In Commerce the court denied the lessee the right to strip mine on the basis that this method of
mining was not within the contemplation of the parties. Id. On the other hand, the Wiser decision
indicates that the court would permit strip mining, but would require payment for the destruction of
the surface. See Wiser Oil Co. v. Conley, 346 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960) (allowing a
surface destructive method of oil and gas extraction, but requiring payment for surface damages).
For a discussion of Wiser, see supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
72. See Act of Mar. 5, 1951, ch. 236, 1951 Ind. Acts 678 (current version at IND. CODE ANN. ch.
32-5-7 (Burns 1980 & Supp. 1986)). Section 32-5-7-5 of the Indiana Code provides as follows:
"This chapter is intended to declare the law of this state with regard to the subject matter treated
herein [oil and gas estates] as such law existed prior to March 5, 1951." IND. CODE ANN. S 32-5-7-5
(Burns Supp. 1986).
73. See IND. CODE ANN. S 32-5-7-2 (Burns Supp. 1986). Section 32-5-7-2 provides, in pertinent
part, as follows:
Any grant or reservation contained in any instrument affecting lands in this state
and purporting to convey or transfer any interest in the oil and gas in or on or under or
that may be produced from beneath the surface of such lands shall be deemed to
transfer to the named recipient the following expressed rights and privileges in
addition to any other rights naturally flowing from the character of such instrument in
law, such express rights and privileges being as follows:
(b) Any such person in interest in the oil and gas estate in lands in this state
shall be further entitled to enter upon such lands for the purpose of drilling
thereon a well or test well for the production or attempted production ofoil and
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also imposes upon the mineral owner the obligation to pay for any
damage occasioned to the surface as a result of the oil and gas
operations.
74
Interestingly, the Indiana statutory provision that requires the
mineral owner to pay the surface owner for land damaged during
the extraction process is not restricted to those situations in which
the mineral owner's surface rights are created by implication.
75
This is true even though the statutorily implied rights are created in
the same section in which the obligation to pay is created. 76 Thus, it
seems that the statute creates, or recognizes the existence of, a
mineral owner's obligation to pay surface damages even when the
surface access was expressly granted in the severance deed. 77 Since
the "right of ingress and egress" appears with regularity in deeds
severing minerals78  the statute applies to most oil and gas
conveyances. In fact, since the Indiana statute clearly imposes
upon "[a]ny person" the obligation to pay for "the actual damage
resulting therefrom to the surface of such lands,'' 79 it might even
apply in situations in which the severed mineral owner was granted
the express right to use the surface free of charge. At least, the
statute does not provide an exception for this situation. The
gas therefrom, regardless of whether or not such person is also the owner or
lessee or licensee of an owner of an interest in the surface rights in such lands,
and further regardless of whether or not the owner or owners of the remaining
rights in said lands consent thereto....
Id.
74. See id. 5 32-5-7-2(c) (Burns Supp. 1986). Subsection 32-5- 7-2(c) provides as follows:
Any person who, being lawfully entitled to do so, enters upon any lands in this
state for the purpose of exploring, prospecting, testing, surveying, or otherwise
investigating the potential of such lands for oil and gas, or for the purpose of
conducting operations thereon for the production of oil and gas, shall be accountable
to the owner of the surface of such lands for the actual damage resulting therefrom to
the surface of such lands or improvements or growing crops located thereon: Provided,
however, That in such case, no punitive damages shall be assessed; and Provided
further, That this section shall not operate to increase any damages as between lessor
and lessee in any valid and subsisting oil and gas lease where such lease purports to
deal with the subject of damages....
Id.
75. See id. 5 32-5-7-2(b), (c) (Burns Supp. 1986) (statute applies to "[a]ny grant" of an oil and
gas interest). For the texts of subsections (b) and (c) of5 32-5-7-2, see supra notes 73-74.
76. See id. § 32-5-7-2(b), (c). For the text of S 32-5-7-2(b), which sets forth the rights of the
mineral owner, see supra note 73. For the text of 5 32-5-7-2(c), which creates the obligation to pay,
see supra note 74.
77. See id. S 37-5-7-2(c) ("[a]ny person" engaged in oil and gas production must pay for surface
damages). For the text of § 37 -5-7-2(c), see supra note 74.
78. See Discussion Notes in II OIL & GAs REP. 297, following Parker v. Texas Co., 326 S.W.2d
579, 11 OIL & GAs REP. 293 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). In the discussion notes following Parker, the
editors note that the right of ingress and egress is one of the usual and customary rights granted in a
mineral deed. Id.
79. IND. CODE ANN. S 32-5-7-2(c) (Burns Supp. 1986). For the text of § 32-5-7-2(c) of the
Indiana Code, see supra note 74.
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statute does, however, provide for the following exception: "[the
statute] shall not operate to increase any damages as between lessor
and lessee in any valid and subsisting oil and gas lease where such
lease purports to deal with the subject of damages.... "80
The possibility that a mineral owner must pay surface
damages despite permission to use the surface free of charge is
analogous to some strip mining cases. In these cases the existence of
a waiver of damage clause, coupled with an express easement, did
not prevent the courts from holding that the coal owner did not
have the right to strip mine. 81 Both the Indiana statute and the strip
mining cases give no effect to provisions that purport to grant the
mineral owner the free use of the surface. In the strip mining cases,
this result is accomplished by denying the mineral owner the right
to make the contested use.8 2 The Indiana statute, on the other
hand, extends the right of use but accompanies it with an
obligation to pay.8 3 Courts could, however, conclude that a lease
provision providing for use of the surface free of charge does, in
fact, address the issue of damages and thus falls within the
statutory exception to mineral lessee liability.8
4
The Indiana statute also imposes an obligation upon a mineral
owner to pay for damages to growing crops located on the surface
estate.8 5 It is not entirely clear, however, how this provision relates
to the provision that the act "shall not operate to increase any
damages as between lessor and lessee." '86 The uncertainty stems
from the fact that oil and gas leases quite commonly contain a
provision that requires the lessee to pay for damages to growing
crops.8 7 It is arguable that this type of lease provision covers the
gamut of surface damages allowable under the lease. Accordingly,
if a court were to allow damages other than those occasioned to
crops, the court would violate the terms of the statute. Courts have
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Wilkes-Barre Township School Dist. v. Corgan, 403 Pa. 383, -, 170 A.2d 97,
98-101 (1961):
82. See Commerce Union Bank v. Kinkade, 540 S.W.2d 861, 864 (Ky. 1976); Wilkes, 403 Pa. at
_ 170 A.2d at 99-100.
83. See IND. CODE ANN. S 32-5-7-2(c) (Burns Supp. 1986) (obligation to pay for surface
damages). For the text of S 37-5-7-2(c), see supra note 74. In Wiser Oil Co. v. Conley, the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky also imposed an obligation upon an oil and gas lessee to pay damages even
though the right of use was expressly created in the oil and gas lease. Wiser Oil Co. v. Conley,
340 S.W.2d 718, 720-21 (Ky. 1960). For a discussion of Wiser, see supra notes 24-31 and
accompanying text.
84. See IN . CODE ANN. 5 32-5-7-2(c) (Burns Supp. 1986). For the text of § 32 -5-7-2(c) of the
Indiana Code, see supra note 74.
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. See, e.g., Wohlford v. American Gas Prod. Co., 218 F.2d 213, 215 (5th Cir. 1955) (lease
provided that the lessee would pay for damages to growing crops); Flying Diamond Corp. v. Rust,
551 P.2d 509, 511 (Utah 1976) (same).
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held, however, that the presence of a crop damages clause does not
prevent the imposition of liability for other damages.8 8 Moreover,
lessees do, in practice, pay other damages despite the existence of
the crop damages clause.
In 1982, Oklahoma adopted the Surface Damages Act.8 9 The
Act provides the procedures for resolving claims for surface
damages that result from oil and gas operations.9" The Act requires
the mineral developer to give surface owners notice of
developmental activity. 91 The Act also requires the parties to
negotiate in good faith for the settlement of surface damage
claims. 92 A procedure is also provided for the court to appoint
appraisers if an agreement concerning surface damages cannot be
reached between the parties. 93 The most remarkable aspect of the
88. See, e.g., Wohford, 218 F.2d at 215 (providing for other damages when the lease contained
only a crop damages clause); Thompson v. Andover Oil Co., 691 P.2d 77, 84 (Okla. App. 1984)
(sarte).
89. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, 5§ 318.2 to .9 (West Supp. 1987).
90. See id.
91. See id. tit. 52, 5 318.3. Section 318.3 of title 52 of the Oklahoma Statutes provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:
Before entering upon a site for oil or gas drilling, except in instances where there
are non-state resident surface owners, non-state resident surface tenants, unknown
heirs, imperfect titles, surface owners, or surface tenants whose whereabouts cannot
be ascertained with reasonable diligence, the operator shall give to the surface owner a
written notice of his intent to drill containing a designation of the proposed location
and the approximate date that the operator proposes to commence drilling.
Such notice shall be given in writing by certified mail to the surface owner. If the
operator makes an affidavit that he has conducted a search with reasonable diligence
and the whereabouts of the surface owner cannot be ascertained or such notice cannot
be delivered, then constructive notice of the intent to drill may be given in the same
manner as provided for the notice of proceedings to appoint appraisers.
Id.
92. See id. Section 318.3 of title 52 of the Oklahoma Statutes provides, in pertinent part, as
follows: "Within five (5) days of the date of delivery or service of the notice of intent to drill, it shall
be the duty of the operator and the surface owner to enter into good faith negotiations to determine
surface damages." Id.
93. See id. tit. 52, § 318.5. Section 318.5 of title 52 of the Oklahoma Statutes provides, in
pertinent part, as follows:
A. Prior to entering the site with heavy equipment, the operator shall negotiate
with the surface owner for the payment of any damages which may be caused by the
drilling operation. If the parties agree, and a written contract is signed, the operator
may enter the site to drill. If agreement is not reached, or if the operator is not able to
contact all parties, the operator shall petition the district court in the county in which
the drilling site is located for appointment of appraisers to make recommendations to
the parties and to the court concerning the amount of damages, if any. Once the
operator has petitioned for appointment of appraisers, he may enter the site to drill.
C. The operator shall select one appraiser, the surface owner shall select one
appraiser, and the two selected appraisers shall select a third appraiser for
appointment by the court. If either of the parties fails to appoint an appraiser or if the
two appraisers cannot agree on the selection of the third appraiser, the remaining
required appraisers shall be selected by the district court.... [The appraisersl shall
inspect the real property and consider the surface damages which the owner has
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statute, however, is that it provides no guidelines concerning the
basis for imposing liability. 94 It does not ihdicate when, or why, or
in what amount-the developer shall be liable for surface damages. 95
In Oklahoma, prior to the enactment of the Act, the mineral
developer's liability was based upon the common-law easement
approach. 96 This, of course, meant that the mineral owner was not
subject to liability unless he or she used more of the surface than
was reasonably necessary. 97 The statute, however, appears to be
based on the assumption that the mineral developer is liable for any
surface damages that result from drilling operations. 98 Thus, the
statute indicates that the Oklahoma Legislature did not believe that
this area of the law is governed by judicial opinions that established
the rules relating to the surface rights of mineral developers. The
legislature apparently assumed that the parties in mineral
sustained or will sustain by reason of entry upon the subject land and by reason of
drilling or maintenance of oil or gas production on the subject tract of land.... The
appraisers shall make a valuation and determine the amount of compensation to be
paid by the operator to the surface owner and the manner in which the amount shall be
paid. Said appraisers shall then make a report of their proceedings to the court. The
compensation of the appraisers shall be fixed and determined by the court. The
operator and the surface owner shall share equally in the payment of the appraiser's
fees and court costs.
Id.
94. See Discussion notes in 83 OIL & GAS REP. 152, following Thompson v. Andover Oil Co.,
691 P.2d 77, 83 01 & GAS REp. 141 (Okla. App. 1984). In the discussion notes following Thompion,
the editors state:
The Surface Damages Act does not define "surface damages," nor contain any
language limiting recovery to situations where use of the surface is not "reasonably
necessary." Rather, the plain language of the statute seems to impose strict liability of
Isic] an oil and gas operator for surface damages, which arguably contradicts case law,
including the instant case, establishing the principle that a lessor, by executing a
mineral lease, impliedly authorizes a lessee to do such damage as is reasonably
necessary to conduct operations permitted under their lease. On the other hand, if
liability is to be based on whether the use of the surface was reasonable, then the
operator/lessee would be liable only for excessive use....
Id. at 155.
95. See id.
96. See, e.g., Wilcox Oil Co. v. Lawson, 341 P.2d 591, 594 (Okla. 1959). Itn Wilcox Oil the court
stated the following concerning the basis ofa mineral lessee's liability:
The holder of a valid oil and gas lease has the right and privilege to go on the land
and do all those things necessary and incidental to the drilling of wells, including the
right to the use of the surface, and in the absence of a provision that lessee would be
liable for growing crops, the only basis for recovery of damages is proof of wanton or
negligent destruction, or that damages were to [a] portion of land not reasonably
necessary for oil and gas development.
Id.
97. See id.
98. SeeOKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, 5 318.3, 318.5 (West Supp. 1987) (oil and gas operator shall
negotiate with surface owner for payment of damages caused by drilling). For the text of § 318.3, see
supra note 92. For the text of 318.5, see supra note 93.
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transactions define their relationship according to a principle that is
the exact opposite of the principle set forth in judicial opinions. The
legislature assumed that the mineral developer is obligated to pay
for the surface area consumed; yet the court opinions had granted
an implied easement for the surface consumed and did not require
payment for that consumption. 9
The North Dakota Legislature has taken the most recent
significant step in this area of the law, a step unfettered by the
common-law easement approach. The Oil and Gas Production
Damage Compensation Act imposes an obligation on the mineral
developer to pay surface damages whenever damage results from
the execution of an oil and gas lease. 100 The statute was adopted
despite a common-law background in North Dakota very similar to
that of the rest of the country.
In Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaught 01 the North Dakota Supreme
Court upheld an injunction that enjoined surface owners from
interfering with mineral operations conducted on their land. 102 The
court's decision was based upon the traditional common-law
implied easement approach, which entitled the mineral owner to
use as much of the surface as was reasonably necessary to develop
99. Compare id. tit. 52, SS 318.3, 318.5 (operator shall negotiate for payment of damages) with
Wilcox Oil Co. v. Lawson, 341 P.2d 591, 594 (Okli. 1959) (mineral owner is not liable for ordinary
surface damages).
100. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 38-11.1-04 (Supp. 1985). Section 38-11.1-04 of the North Dakota
Century Code provides as follows:
The mineral developer shall pay the surface owner a sum of money equal to the
amount of damages sustained by the surface owner for loss of agricultural production
and income, lost land value, lost use of and access to the surface owner's land, and lost
value of improvements caused by drilling operations. The amount of damages may' be
determined by any formula mutually agreeable between the surface owner and the
mineral developer. When determining damages, consideration shall be given to the
period of time during which the loss occurs and the surface owner may elect to be paid
damages in annual installments over a period of time; except that the surface owner
shall be compensated for harm caused by exploration only by a single sum payment.
The payments contemplated by this section shall only cover land directly affected by
drilling operations. Payments under this section are intended to compensate the actual
surface owner for damage and disruption; any reservation or assignment of such
compensation apart from the surface estate except to a tenant of the surface estate is
prohibited.
Id. Montana, following North Dakota's lead, has adopted a statute substantially similar tol 38-11.1-
04 of the North Dakota Century Code. See MONT. CODE ANN. S 82-10-504 (1985).
101. 283 N.W.2d 131 (N.D. 1979).
102. Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 133 (N.D. 1979). The defendants in Kerbautqh
were surface owners who objected to geophysical exploration of their land by Hunt Oil. Id. The
defendants acquired this land by a warranty deed which stated that Hunt Oil's predecessor in
interest reserved "ALL of the minerals, including oil and gas, in and under or that may be produced
and saved from said lands, together with the right of ingress and egress." Id. (emphasis in original).
Hunt Oil obtained an in junction preventing the defendants from interfering with the exploration of
the land. Id.
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the mineral estate. 10 3 The court, however, did not consider the
question of damages because the remedy sought was an
injunction. 104 Thus, only the mineral owner's right of access was
before the court.105 In a footnote, however, the court observed that
the damages question had been universally resolved: no liability
accompanies the existence of an implied easement. 
106
The court did imply, however, that another view might be
preferable - the view that the right of use should be accompanied
by an obligation to pay. 10 7 In this regard, the court stated that the
common-law easement approach
seems to rest on a principle that injury necessarily
inflicted in the exercise of a lawful right does not create a
liability.... We question, however, the social desirability
of a rule which potentially allows the damage or
destruction of a surface estate equal or greater in value
than the value of the mineral being extracted.' 08
In the same year that Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh was decided, the
North Dakota Legislature adopted The Oil and Gas Production
Damage Compensation Act.' 0 9 According to the Act, an oil and gas
developer must compensate a surface owner for any damages that
103. Id. at 135. The court stated the following concerning the mineral owner's right to use a
reasonable amount of the surface:
"WUinless the language of the conveyance repels such a construction, as a general rule
a grant of mines or minerals gives to the owner of the minerals the incidental right of
entering, occupying, and making such use of the surface lands as is reasonably
necessary in exploring, mining, removing, and marketing the minerals...."
Id. (quoting Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 550 (N.D. 1973)).
104. Id. at 135 n.4.
105. See id.
106. Id. The court stated that "Itihe authorities which have considered the issue appear to be in
agreement that such damages are damnum absque injuria [in ury without legal redress] and no recovery
can be had against the mineral estate owner or lessee." Id.
107. Seeid. at 136.
108. Id. at 135 n.4. The court elaborated on the surface damages issue:
"Future mineral exploration and development can be expected to expand as our
demands for energy sources grow. Equity requires a closer examination of whether or
not the cost of surface damage and destruction arising from mineral development
should be borne by the owner of a severed surface estate or by the developer and
consumer of the minerals. Although we do not doubt the mineral estate owner's right
to use the surface estate to explore, develop and transport the minerals, we specifically
do not decide if the right of reasonable use also implies the right to damage and destroy
without compensation."
Id. (quoting Wilcox Oil Co. v. Lawson, 301 P.2d 686, 687 (Okla. 1953)).
109. See Oil and Gas Production Damage Compensation Act, ch. 396, 1979 N.D. Laws 952
(codified at N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 38-11.1 (1980 and Supp. 1985)).
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result from mineral development. 110 The Act provides that among
the damages which must'be paid are those relating to "lost land
value," and that, in computing damages, "consideration shall be
given to the period of time during which the loss occurs. '
Furthermore, the Act provides procedures for settling claims. 
112
An unusual aspect of the North Dakota Act is that it operates
retroactively; it contains no exemption for mineral owners whose
interests were created prior to the effective date of the Act.
1 13
Retroactive application of the Act presents serious questions
concerning the constitutionality of the Act. Arguably, retroactive
application would violate the contract clause and the due process
clause of the United States Constitution. 1 4
It is possible that the retroactive application of the North
Dakota Act reflects the North Dakota Legislature's opinion that
those engaged in the extractive industries expect to and do pay for
costs associated with the use of the surface. If this is the legislative
assumption, and if it is correct, then the constitutional concerns of
110. N.D. CENT. CODE S 38-11.1-04 (Supp. 1985). For the text of 5 38-11.1-04 of the North
Dakota Century Code, see supra note 100.
111. Id.
112. See id. 5§ 38-11.1-08 to -09 (Supp. 1985). Section 38-11.1-08 ofthe North Dakota Century
Code provides as follows:
Unless both parties provide otherwise by written agreement, at the time the
notice required by section 38-11.1-05 is given, the mineral developer shall make a
written offer of settlement to the person seeking compensation for damages when the
notice required by section 38-11.1-05 is given. The person seeking compensation may
accept or reject any offer so made.
Id. 38-11.1-08. Section 38-11.1-09 provides as follows:
If the person seeking compensation rejects the offer of the mineral developer, that
person may bring an action for compensation in the court of proper jurisdiction. If the
amount of compensation awarded by the court is greater than that which had been
offered by the mineral developer, the court shall award the person seeking
compensation reasonable attorney fees, any costs assessed by the court, and interest on
the amount of the final compensation awarded by the court from the day drilling is
commenced. The rate of interest awarded must be the prime rate charged by the Bank
of North Dakota on the date of the judgment.
Id. § 38-11.1-09.
113. See Murphy v. Amoco Prod. Co., 729 F.2d 552, 554 (8th Cir. 1984) (the North Dakota Act
applies to mineral leases executed prior to the effective date of the Act). For a discussion of Murphy,
see infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
114. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (contract clause); id. amend. XIV, 5 1 (due process
clause). The contract clause prohibits government impairment of contractual obligations. Id. art. 1, §
10, cl. 1. The due process clause prohibits the government from taking private property without due
process of law. See id. amend. XIV, 5 1. A mineral owner might argue that prior to the enactment of
the North Dakota Act, the mineral owner had already obtained, either expressly within the lease, or
by implication of law, the right to the free use of the surface. Retroactive application of the Act
destroys the prior right, and thus, may constitute governmental interference with contractual rights.
In addition, if the court viewed the mineral owner's expectation of free use as a vested property right,
retroactive application of the Act could constitute the taking of property without due process of law.
For a discussion of the treatment of these issues by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, see
infra notes 116-2.6 and accompanying text.
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the Act are diminished: if the mineral owners have no genuine
expectation of free surface use then no expectation interest exists
that is entitled to due process protection. 15
The constitutionality of the North Dakota Act has been
litigated in federal court. In Murphy v. Amoco Production Co. 116 the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the Act's
constitutionality against a due process challenge."17 Although the
decision may be correct, the reasoning of the court smacks of
sophistry. Instead of addressing the real question - whether the
expectations of the mineral owners constituted a property right -
the court simply recharacterized the relationship between the
parties from "easement," 1 8 which is clearly property, to tort." 9
115. For a brief discussion of due process protection for expectation interests, see supra note 114.
116. 729 F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1984). The plaintiffin Murphy owned the surface rights to a tract of
land, and the defendant, Amoco, leased the mineral rights. Murphy v. Amoco Prod. Co., 729 F.2d
552. 554 (8th Cir. 1984). The lease between the parties provided that the defendant would pay for
any damage to crops or improvements resulting from the development of the land's minerals. Id. At
trial, the jury awarded Murphy $4967 for lost land value, in addition to $5634.49 for lost agricultural
production. Id.
117. Id. at 560. The appellant, Amoco, challenged the North Dakota Surface Damages Act on
several constitutional grounds, including the due process, just compensation, and equal protection
clauses of the federal constitution, and the special privileges and uniform laws provisions of the
North Dakota Constitution. Id. at 554. The court rejected each challenge. Id. at 556, 559-60.
Amoco also asserted that North Dakota's Surface Damage Act violated the contract clause of the
United States Constitution. Id. at 557. The court noted that in cases involving a contract clause
challenge, a court must balance the interest of the state in maintaining the challenged legislation
against the severity of impairment of contractual rights. See id. The court acknowledged North
Dakota's legitimate interest in promoting agriculture. See id. at 555. The court concluded that the
impact on agriculture by oil drilling was great, while the additional liability upon the mineral lessee
was de minimis. See id. at 557. Thus, weighing the two interests, the court stated that the North
Dakota legislation did not impose a great burden on Amoco's contractual rights. Id.
The court also stated that it is plausible that the Act does not, in any manner, impair contracts.
Id. The court made this conclusion after determining that the Act does not change any of the rights
governed by the lease; rather, it changes state tort law, which the lease did not purport to govern. Id.
at 558. The court stated:
Furthermore, nothing in the lease purports to vary the general principle that the law as
it stands at the time ofa tortious occurrence governs the parties' liabilities for that tort
(even assuming that the parties had the power by private agreement so to provide).
The fair implication from the lease itself, then, is that the surface owner is entitled to
whatever damages state tort law might provide as of the time mineral development
actually occurs, in addition to the contractually-provided compensation for damage to
crops and improvements. The enactment of chapter 38-11.1 [North Dakota's Surface
Damages Act] changed state tort law, but it did not in any way affect the lessee's
liability respecting the only two elements of damages to which the lease itself actually
spoke - damage to crops and damage to improvements. The enactment of chapter
38-11.1 thus worked no impairment of any right or obligation arising from the lease
itself. It merely changed state tort law, from which the parties to the lease never
purported to exempt themselves.
Id.
118. Although an easement would generally be considered a property right and an arbitrary
tertnination of such interests by legislative act would seem to be a per se taking of property without
due' process of law, there is some question whether the expectation of the parties to a mineral lease is
consistent with the easement characterization applied to the relationship by the courts. For a
discussion of the apparent expectations of parties to a mineral lease, see infra section V. If the parties
expectations are not consistent with the easement characterization, then there might still be a
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The court then concluded that the statute merely changed the
standard of liability from negligence to absolute liability. 120 It then
reasoned that no individual has a vested interest in the standards by
which tort liability is measured. I21 Thus, the retroactive application
of the statute was constitutional. 122 A problem with the court's
reasoning, however, is that it could be used to justify almost any
taking of property.
The opinion also contained a police power justification,123 with
which it is more difficult to quarrel. The court reasoned that the
statute was an effective use of the state's police power because the
statute was directly related to the state's strong interest in
promoting agriculture. 124 The statute promotes agriculture because
question whether the mere fact that the courts have so characterized the relationship raises the
expectation to the level of a property right. The characterization of the right as an "easement" by the
courts is, of course, a statement that there is a right of free use. Does this statement alone, regardless
of how the parties order their relationships, justify the mineral lessee's expectation? The United
States Supreme Court's discussion of property rights in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972), seems particularly appropriate to the issues discussed here. In Roth the Court stated: "It is a
purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their
daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined." Id. at 577. Similarly, in Swann v.
Gastonia Hous. Auth., 675 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1982), the court stated: "For the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to dictate the procedure to be followed before a tenant is evicted,...
the tenant must have an expectation, rising to the status of a property interest, of remaining in his
home .... " Id. at 1345-46; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1 (due process clause); supra note 114
(discussing potential constitutional problems with the statutory alteration of the parties'
expectations). Although the appellate court in Swann found the right to be implied in a statute, the
trial court had found it implied by custom as well as by statute. Swann, 675 F.2d at 1344, 1346; see also
Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1241 (4th Cir. 1973) (public housing tenant had due process rights,
supported by statute and custom, to continued tenancy).
119. Murphy, 729 F.2d at 557-58.
120. Id. at 557. The court stated as follows:
The lease made Amoco strictly liable for any damages to crops or to improvements
which resulted from drilling operations. . . . [E]xisting state law obligated lessees to
pay for any damages to the surface estate resulting from negligence.... Thus the only
additional liability to which the statute subjected Amoco in this case was the obligation
to compensate Murphy for losses in the value of the land which resulted from
reasonable (that is, non-negligent) drilling activities.
Id.
121. Id. at 558. The court's discussion of the North Dakota Siirface Damages Act's effect on the
taking of property was brief. See id. The court did, however, state the following concerning whether a
state's adjustment of tort law could ever amount to a "taking," thus requiring due process standards
to l)e met:
The requirement that Amoco pay the surface owner for the damage that Amoco itself
actually causes to the surface estate does not amount to a governmental taking of
private property for public use at all. If it did, then any new rule of state law requiring
a tortfeasor to compensate those he harms would constitute a taking in violation of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments.
Id.
122. Id. at 560.
123. See id. at 554-56.
124. Id. at 555. Neither party denied that North Dakota has a strong interest in promoting
agriculture. See id. Moreover, promotion of this interest clearly was the purpose for passing the North
Dakota Act. See Oil and Gas Production Damage Compensation Act, ch. 396, 1979 N.D. Laws 952.
The North Dakota Legislature declared the following when enacting the statute:
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it imposes an additional cost upon the mineral owners: the payment
of surface damages in every case. This cost deters mineral owners
from disrupting the surface of agricultural land. 
125
Perhaps the most important aspect of the decision, however, is
that neither the trial court, nor the court of appeals, concluded that
the retroactive application of the statute was grossly unfair. The
reason for this conclusion might be the recognition that the mineral
owner generally pays the surface owner for the surface consumed.
As previously noted, appellate court decisions from oil producing
states have indicated an understanding that the right to free use of
the surface exists only in theory.
1 26
Even those courts that have recently upheld the mineral
owner's implied right of access without cost have expressed regret
for their decisions. t 27 In Vest v. Exxon Corp., 128 for example, the trial
court entered judgment in favor of surface owners whose pasture
land had been destroyed through oil drilling. 29 The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed but expressed regret for its
enforcement of a rule - the traditional common-law easement
doctrine - that was an obvious source of frustration and
1. It is necessary to exercise the police power of the state to protect the public
welfare of North Dakota which is largely dependent on agriculture, and to protect the
economic well-being of individuals engaged in agricultural production.
2. Exploration for and development of. oil and gas reserves in this state interferes
with the use, agricultural or otherwise, of the surface of certain land.
Id. § 1.
125. 729 F.2d at 555. Amoco argued that the Act did not promote the public welfare because the
compensation would not be used to restore the land. Id. The court responded to that argument as
follows:
The requirement that mineral developers compensate surface owners for damage they
cause may well serve as an incentive for developers not to drill, and thereby disrupt
surface uses, where drilling is not likely to yield enough oil or gas to justify the loss to
the economy from disruption of surface productivity. The compensation requirement
might also create an incentive for developers not to cause unnecessary surface damage,
and to remedy any damage - avoidable or unavoidable - they may cause without
necessitating resort to the courts by surface owners suing under the terms of a lease or
under the common law of negligence.
Id.
126. See, e.g., Barker v. Mintz, 73 Colo. 262, -, 215 P. 534, 535 (1923) (surface owner
entitled to compensation for damage resulting from strip mining); Wiser Oil Co. v. Conley, 346
S.W.2d 718, 721 (Ky. 1960) (oil and gas lessee must compensate surface owner when surface damage
is substantial); Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1984) (mineral owner
must pay for the surface damaged in the acquisition of minerals not specified in the mineral lease).
For a discussion of Barker, see supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Wiser, see
supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Moser, see supra notes 60-71 and
accompanying text.
127. SeeVest v. Exxon Corp., 752 F.2d 959, 960-61 (5th Cir. 1985).
128. 752 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1985).
129. Vest v. Exxon Corp., 752 F.2d 959, 961 (5th Cir. 1985). In Vest the plaintiffs owned 1440
acres of land. Id. They ran cows on the land. Id. Exxon, the owner of the mineral interest in the land,
drilled wells until it saturated the land. Id. .Exxon paid for some of the land it consumed. Id. After it
refused to pay for the land consumed by the last 21 wells drilled, plaintiffs commenced action. Id.
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annoyance to surface owners.130 Thus, the court termed the case
"fascinating" because of the "predicament and frustration of
surface-only landowners. ' 131 The court also noted that Texas law
operates" [sladly for the surface owner."
132
V. AN ANALYSIS OF THE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES
OF THE PARTIES TO A MINERAL LEASE
If, in fact, all the parties involved in these transactions believe
that the developmental industries should bear the costs of surface
damages, then it is difficult to argue that mineral owners have a
reasonable expectation of using the surface free of charge. If the
mineral owner has no expectation that the use of the surface estate
will be free of charge, then there is no problem with a statute that
requires payment for surface damage. Thus, it seems that an
inquiry into the beliefs and practices of the people who engage in
these transactions is important to the question whether
retrospective application of a damage payment statute violates the
due process rights of mineral owners.
Disparity between the appellate courts and the extraction
industries regarding the liability of mineral owners for surface
damage is of long Standing. This disparity was noted by Eugene 0.
Kuntz, a prominent oil and gas scholar. Mr. Kuntz stated:
The frequent practice on the part of operators to pay
location damage in order to preserve amicable relations
with the surface owner or lessor has led to a widespread notion
that a mineral owner or oil and gas lessee must compensate the
130. See id. at 960-61. The court stated the following concerning the predicament of the surfac
owner:
This appellate record is an interesting, even fascinating, one to read. Not that it
presents a challenging legal puzzle, but it does display the predicament and frustration
of surface-only landowners when the mineral lessees interfere with the surface use in
order to pursue their opportunities and obligations in the extraction of minerals. From
the viewpoint of the surface owner when mineral operations are conducted all across
his land, interfering constantly with his ranching or farming, the mineral use becomes
unreasonable. But the mineral operator who employs the usual and customary
methods of the industry views the matter differently; it would be unreasonable for him
to give way to grazing animals by not developing the underlying minerals, i.e., by not
drilling wells and building roads and power lines and flow lines and tank batteries.
The viewpoint of these parties on reasonableness is quite different. Sadly for the
surface owner, Texas law, which governs in the present case, implies that a mineral
lease gives a large measure of deference to the lessee's view of reasonableness.
Id.
131. Id. at 960.
132. Id.
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surface owner for any damage to the land resulting from oil and gas
operations.... [T]his widespread notion has no support in
the law. 
133
In an effort to determine the attitudes of the parties to these
transactions, the author mailed a questionnaire to the operators
and surface owners named in 196 drilling permit applications filed
in Oklahoma and Michigan. Oklahoma and Michigan were
selected because those states require the permit applicant to list the
name and address of the surface owner in the application.
Responses were received from one or both of the parties
involved in forty-seven of the Oklahoma wells and seventy of the
Michigan wells. Striking differences existed between the responses
received from the two states. Surface damages were paid, or
liability acknowledged, for all but one of the wells drilled in
Oklahoma. In Michigan, however, one or both parties of ten of the
seventy wells indicated that they did not expect the operator to pay
for surface damages. Furthermore, the amounts paid in Oklahoma
for surface damage were substantially greater than the amounts
paid in Michigan. Moreover, parties to the Michigan transactions
were less willing to divulge information about the transactions.
The amounts paid for surface damages in Oklahoma ranged
from $300 to $10,000 per well, with the average payment about
$3627.134 The most frequently paid amount was $2500.135 In
133. Discussion Notes by Eugene 0. Kuntz in 10 OIL & GAS REP. 996, following Wilcox Oil
Co. v. Lawson, 341 P.2d 591, 10 OIL & GAS REP. 991 (Okla. 1959). In Wilcox the plaintiffs suffered
damage to their alfalfa from the drilling of two oil wells. 341 P.2d at 593, 10 OIL & GAS REP. at 993.
The plantiffs sued and the jury granted the plantiffs a verdict in the amount of $625. Id. at 594, 10
OIL & GAS REP. at 994. The purpose of the verdict was to compensate the plaintiffs for their
damaged crops. Id. The trial court, however, applied the traditional common-law easement
doctrine, under which the mineral owner is liable only for unreasonable damage to the surface, and
concluded that the negligence of the defendant could not have caused injury to the plaintiff in the
amount of the verdict. Id. at 595, 10 OIL & GAs REP. at 995. Thus, the court held that the plaintiffs
must file a remittitur of $379.15. Id. at 596, 10 OIL & GAS Rap. at 996.
134. There were 43 wells in Oklahoma from which one or both of the parties reported the
amount paid. Concerning some of the wells, the operator and surface owner disagreed on the amount
paid. In those cases, the higher amount was used in the summary printed below. The following is a
summary of the number of wells and the amounts paid for surface damages in Oklahoma:
Amount Paid No. of Wells Amount Paid No. of Wells
10000 2 2500 6
9000 1 2300 1
8000 1 2000 2
7500 2 1750 1
6000 2 1600 1
5000 4 1500 5
4500 2 1000 2
4000 3 500 2
3500 1 300 1
3000 4 Average amount paid: $3627 Total wells: 43
135. See note 133.
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situations in which a response was received from the operator and
the surface owner of the same well, it was sometimes difficult to
determine the amount paid because the parties disagreed. For
example, one operator reported paying $2500 for each of two wells
but the surface owner reported receiving $3000 for each well. The
difference may not reflect inaccurate reporting but, rather, may be
the result of the different characterizations by the parties of the
money that changed hands. There were indications in many of the
questionnaires that some of the parties did not include crop
damages as an element of "surface damages.' 1 36 Similarly,
payments for the use of water in the drilling operation may be
regarded as a sale of water, rather than a payment for damage to
the surface. 1
37
Regarding crop damage as something separate from surface
damages may explain some of the ten responses from Michigan
which indicated that no surface damages were paid. In nine of those
ten responses, the respondent indicated that the lease required the
payment of crop damages. Since the questionnaire asked only for
an indication of the payment of surface damages, the respondents
may not have regarded payments received by them for crop
damages as payments for surface damage. Accordingly, these
respondents might have indicated no payments for surface damages
when, in fact, they had received payment for crop damages.
There is, of course, no reason for distinguishing between
amounts paid for crop damage, water damage, and permanent
damage to the land. According to the traditional common-law
easement approach, the lessee is not liable unless he or she uses
more of the surface than is reasonably necessary.13 8 The right to use
any part of the surface estate - including water, stone, crops, or
any other substance - that may be necessary to the drilling
operation is included within this right. 139 The fact that eighty-six of
136. One reason for separately consideriig crop damage is that many oil and gas lease forms
require payment for "damage to growing crops." In fact, the respondents indicated that 86 of the
117 leases contained a "crop damage". clause. The actual number of leases that contained a "crop
damage" clause was probably much greater than 86 because 15 of the respondents did not indicate
the components of their leases. Furthermore, the operator and surface owner in 5 instances disagreed
on the question whether their lease did contain a crop damage clause. In fact, only 11 indicated that
the lease did not contain a provision requiring the payment of crop damages.
137. For example, one landowner stated that he received "S9,000 total settlement for damages,
right-of-way and water." Another stated: "$4,000 drilling and free water - package deal."
138. For a discussion of the traditional common-law approach, see supra notes 4-15 and
accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Mack Oil Co. v. Laurence Executrix, 389 P.2d 955, 957-58 (Okla. 1964) (the
defendant has the right to consume water, without compensation to the surface owner, in the oil
drilling operations); B.L. McFarland Drilling Contractor v. Connell, 344 S.W.2d 493, 495 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1961) (the defendant had the right, without compensation to the surface owner, to dig a pit
from which to extract caliche, a material used to construct a road to the drill site), dismissed on other
grounds, 347 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. 1961).
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the 117 leases contained a clause requiring the payment of crop
damages is some indication that a gap exists between the law, as
established by the courts, and the manner in which the parties to
these transactions order their relationships.
Concerning the parties involved in the sixty Michigan wells for
which the operator was expected to pay surface damages, twelve
were negotiating the issue of surface damages and the remaining
forty-eight had resolved the damages question. Only thirty-five of
the forty-eight parties that settled, however, were willing to reveal
the amount of the settlement. The average amount paid was
approximately $1 166.140
Lest it be contended that these wells involved more than a
reasonable amount of surface usage, for which there would be
liability even under the common-law easement approach, it should
be noted that only one of the Oklahoma respondents indicated that
the surface damage was more than the usual or anticipated amount.
For all other leases, surface damage was either the usual amount or
less. Thus, the Oklahoma sample overwhelmingly indicates that
the parties do not consider the liability for surface damages to be
restricted to those situations in which more than a reasonable
amount of surface damage is caused.' 14  Similarly, in Michigan
fifty-eight of the seventy respondents reported that only the usual or
anticipated amount of damage occurred. Nevertheless, surface
damages were paid in the great majority of cases.1 42
The Oklahoma Surface Damages Act 143 may be the reason for
the apparent harmony concerning the surface damage question in
that state. The parties may construe the Act as creating an
140. In Michigan, the amounts paid for surface damages were as follows:
Amount Paid No. of Wells Amount Paid No. of Wells
$3000 2 800 1
2500 1 675 1
2400 1 600 1
2300 1 550 1
2030 1 500 3
2000 2 400 4
1700 2 200 2
1500 2 50 1
1020 1 Average amount paid: $1166 Total wells: 35
1000 8
141. The operator of one well in Oklahoma reported paying $9000 when less than the usual
amount of damage was done.
142. The amount of money paid in the cases involving more than the usual damage was not very
different from the amount paid for all Michigan leases. The average amount for the excess damage
leases was $1338, and the average for all wells was $1166.
143. OKIA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §S 318.2 to .9 (West Supp. 1987). For a discussion of the
Oklahoma damage settlement statute, see supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
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obligation of the oil operator to pay all damages sustained by the
surface owner.'14 In fact, some of the respondents indicated such a
belief. For example, one of the operators forwarded a copy of the
statute in lieu of providing a copy of the lease provision on
damages. The Act, however, does not specifically require the
operator to pay damages. 14 5 Furthermore, the Oklahoma courts
continue to insist that the operator is obligated to pay damages only
if more of the surface is used than is reasonably necessary. 1
46
The Michigan and Oklahoma responses indicate that practices
in the industry vary from one area to another. In comparison to
Oklahoma, Michigan property owners do not believe as strongly
that the oil developer should be liable for surface damages. In
addition, damage settlements were not reached as quickly in
Michigan. The payments in Michigan were neither as uniform nor
as large as they were in Oklahoma. Moreover, the parties in
Michigan were less willing to disclose the details of the transaction.
There is no way of knowing why this difference in practices
exists between the two states. There may be no explanation other
than the fact that customs vary from area to area. On the other
hand, it may have something to do with the fact that oil drilling is
more common in Oklahoma than in Michigan. 14 7 Perhaps
Oklahoma's greater familiarity with the oil industry, and with the
inconveniences that accompany the production of oil, make oil in
Oklahoma less attractive. For example, in Michigan, one operator
indicated that many landowners are willing to forego surface
damages to get a well drilled on their property. In Oklahoma,
however, landowners' comments indicated that they would rather
not be bothered with the inconveniences of an oil well. 
14 8
144. See id. tit. 52, 5 318.3, 318.5 (requiring the oil operator to negotiate for payment of surface
damages).
145. Seeid. tit. 52, § 318.2 to .9.
146. See, e.g., Thompson v. Andover Oil Co., 691 P.2d 77, 82 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984) (oil and
gas lessee is liable only for damages resulting from negligence and for damage to portion of land not
necessary for oil and gas development).
147. See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE.CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF TIlE
UNITED STATES 1986, 706 (Oklahoma far exceeds Michigan in production of both oil and gas).
148. One Oklahoma landowner said that he would rather have a water well than an oil well. He
stated:
My own preference is not to have [oil wells] on the property, irrespective of the money.
Our place is a 120 acre cow-calf operation, with two wells on it. We don't need the
extra money that much, and it's not worth the hassle - destruction of several acres,
esthetics, pumpers leaving gates open, etc.
Another said, "[T[o me water is worth more than oil."
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This same kind of variation in industry practice exists in areas
less widely separated than Michigan and Oklahoma. 149 For
example, Bernard E. Nordling, an attorney who represents royalty
owners associations in Kansas, indicates that there is a difference
between the practices in eastern Kansas and western Kansas and
that the differences may exist for some of the same reasons as the
differences between Oklahoma and Michigan. 15 0
The differences between Oklahoma and Michigan should not
obscure the fact that, in both states, there exists a general
agreement that the oil industry should pay for surface damages
apart from the compensation bargained for in the oil and gas lease.
In only ten of seventy Michigan wells did the parties not require
payment for surface damages. Furthermore, the oil and gas leases
for those ten wells did contain a provision requiring the payment
for "crop damages." To the extent that the existence of such a
provision indicates a recognition by Michigan landowners of
responsibility for the payment of some surface damages, the
attitudes in Michigan approach those in Oklahoma.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the Michigan and Oklahoma surveys, it is apparent
that the parties who engage in the business of extracting minerals
believe that the extraction industries should bear the cost of surface
damages. This practice exists despite a body of judicially created
law that is based upon an opposite assumption.1 5 1 Interestingly,
when legislatures act in this area, they seem to share the belief that
the extraction industries should bear the costs of the consumed
surface despite the contrary position of the courts. 5 ' Whatever
kind of statement these discordant voices are making about the
nature of law, they do indicate that courts need to reexamine this
question.
149. See Letter from B.E. Nordling to Ronald W. Polston (Oct. 30, 1985). In this letter, B.E.
Nordling stated that amounts for surface damages in Kansas vary from a high of $6000 to a low of
$250. Items considered in determining the amount of surface damages include whether the land is
pasture land, cultivated dry land, or irrigated land; whether a lease contains payment only of "crop
damages;" and the number ofoil wells in the area. Id.
150. Id.
151. For a discussion of the general common-law rule, see supra notes 4-15 and accompanying
lcxt.
152. Compare OKLA. STAT. ANN. tii. 52, §§ 318.3, 318.5 (West Supp. 1987) (operator shall
negotiate for payment of damages) and N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-11.1-04 (Supp. 1985) (mineral
developer shall pay for surface damages) with Wilcox Oil Co. v. Lawson, 341 P.2d 591, 594 (Okla.
1959) (mineral owner is not liable for ordinary surface damages) and Bell v. Cardinal Drilling Co., 85
N.W.2d 246, 250-51 (N.D. 1957) (suggesting that the mineral owner is not liable for ordinary
surface damages).
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Unless the mineral owner has access to the surface, the
mineral lease has no value. Thus, public policy dictates that the
mineral owner should be able to use the surface to reach any
mineral deposits.1 53 The exercise of this right, however, should be
accompanied by the obligation to pay for any resulting damage to
the surface. If the law denied mineral owners the right to use the
surface in a destructive manner, a mining project might be
precluded, and in any case, the surface owner would have an undue
amount of leverage in bargaining with the mineral developer. On
the other hand, giving the developer the right of free use defeats the
surface owner's legitimate expectations.
The right of access and compensation should not depend upon
the contents of the developmental document or mineral
conveyance. The relationship between mineral developer and
surface user is one that may last for many years; accordingly, the
expressions of intention in the documents creating the relationship
may become outdated. Furthermore, the contents of a mineral
conveyance may be based upon a form selected by a land
acquisition agent who has no intention of developing the property.
Instead, the agent merely secures developmental rights that will be
transferred to another party. These may be some of the reasons
why courts addressing mineral leases tend to pay less attention to
the specific terms of the contract and, instead, establish rules of
fairness to govern the relationship between the mineral owner and
surface owner. 154 These may also be the reasons why parties tend to
order their relationships with little regard for the contents of
developmental documents. 155
In fact, the recent legislation discussed in this Article provides
that the mineral owner should pay surface damages in all
instances. 156 These statutes establish the obligation to pay for
153. For a discussion of the policy that requires access to the mineral estate, see supra notes 16-19
and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., McGinnis v. Clayton, 312 S.E.2d 765, 770 (W. Va. 1984) (remanding to
determine the current rate of royalty rather than the royalty rate stated in a turn of the century oil
and gas lease); Polston, Recent Developments in Oil and Gas Law, 6 E. Mm. L. FOUND. § 19.0211 (1985)
(supporting the proposition that fairness, rather than contract terms, governs the relationship
between an oil and gas lessee and lessor).
155. An example of the principle that parties to an oil and gas lease fail to order their
relationship according to the developmental agreement, is that surface damages are usually paid
even though most oil and gas leases require payment for crop damages only.
156. See INn. CODE ANN. S 3 2-5-7-2(c) (Burns Supp. 1986) (mineral operator "shall be
accountable" for surface damages); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-11.1-04 (Supp. 1985) ("mineral
developer shall pay" for surface damages); cf. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 318.3, 318.5 (West Supp.
1987) (parties shall negotiate for payment of surface damages). For the text of § 32-5-7-2(c) of the
Indiana Code, see supra note 74. For the text of § 38-11.1-04 of the North Dakota Century Code, see
supra note 100. For the text of5§ 318.3 and 318.5 of title 52 of the Oklahoma Statutes, see supra notes
92-93.
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surface damages, without regard to whether the surface rights are
expressed in the lease or implied by law.
The time has arrived for the courts to decide the issue of
liability for surface damages on the bases of public policy and the
expectations of the parties. The courts' decisions should be made
with the recognition that the judicial task is to fashion equitable
rules that will govern the relationship between the mineral owner
and the landowner. Emphasis upon ill fitting conceptual packages,
such as "easement," or doctrinal contract law that insists upon
effectuating particular phrases found in ancient leases, has tended
to produce a chaotic, inequitable body of case law.

